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In the aftermath of the Cold War, proliferation of late-20th-century Soviet and NATO 
offensive weaponry has provided many countries and groups around the globe with the 
ability to challenge the defensive infrastructure of neighboring states. With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the struggle between two great superpowers to gain and maintain 
access to regions of strategic interest has been eclipsed by the emergence of new 
threats—corrupt regimes, warlords, and terrorists who now have the capability to attack 
civilian populations, destabilize regional governments, and threaten United States and 
allied strategic interests. 
 Of particular concern are the threats presented by aggressor short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles. These weapons, capable of carrying weaponized chemical or 
biological payloads, are small, mobile, and difficult to track. Aegis, the premiere sea-
based ballistic missile defense (BMD) system of the U.S. Navy, is a high-demand, cost-
limited resource that cannot be mobilized to defend all potential target zones. A smaller, 
more mobile solution is necessary to afford foreign U.S. interests adequate protection. 
This paper details a systems engineering approach to assess the emergent ballistic missile 
threat, synthesize solution options to meet littoral region capability needs, and conduct 
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In the aftermath of the Cold War, proliferation of late-20th-century Soviet and NATO 
offensive weaponry has provided many countries and groups around the globe the ability 
to challenge the defensive infrastructure of neighboring states. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the struggle between two great superpowers to gain and maintain access to 
regions of strategic interest has been eclipsed by the emergence of new threats—corrupt 
regimes, warlords, and terrorists now having the capability to attack civilian populations, 
destabilize regional governments, and threaten United States and Allied strategic 
interests. 
Of particular concern are the threats presented by aggressor short- and medium- 
range ballistic missile attacks. The weapons, capable of carrying weaponized chemical or 
biological payloads, are small, mobile, and difficult to track. The premiere sea-based 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) system of the U.S. Navy, Aegis, is a high-demand, high-
operational-cost limited resource, and cannot be mobilized to defend all potential target 
zones. According to the United Nations’ report on Environment and Development “more 
than half the world’s population lives within 60 km of the shoreline, and this could rise to 
three quarters by the year 2020” (United Nations, 1992). Given this rising population 
increase in the littoral coastline regions, smaller, more mobile, sea-based solution is 
necessary to afford foreign U.S. interests adequate protection against ballistic missile 
attack.   
This report highlights the key benefits and challenges of a Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) BMD mission package as a flexible, cost-effective approach for fulfilling the 
BMD mission in littoral regions. Following a systems engineering methodology, the open 
architecture design unique to the LCS is considered through the initial stages of the 
system concept development process.  
Through requirements analysis, cost and performance thresholds were determined 
and the LCS sea frame integration metrics were identified. Only publicly sourced 
xviii 
information was used in the analysis, which necessitated use of a comparative approach 
to assign mission performance success measures. Specifically, the assumption that the 
Aegis platform meets the U.S. Navy requirement for BMD was used as the key 
performance criteria in assessment of candidate mission package configurations in 
fulfilling the BMD mission need.   
To support synthesis and assessment of candidate BMD mission packages, a high-
level look at the threat possibilities lead to the development of a design reference mission 
(DRM) where the threat country launches a combination of scud and ballistic missiles 
from three different locations, all within 800 km of the asset. A design of experiments 
was conducted using a range of available radars, fire control systems, and engagement 
systems. Using public domain characteristic data for these elements, BMD effectiveness 
of each variant is then evaluated by modeling each of the associated components in 
simulation algorithms, and then subjecting the resulting simulated BMD system variant to 
the design reference mission-specified, simulated salvo attack. The simulations, run many 
times, enabled assessment of the likelihood that the variant will be successful in 
neutralizing a multiple-missile attack, in terms of a “probability of raid  
annihilation” (PRA).   
As a result, the analysis identified several “packages” that could perform as 
effectively as the Aegis system in the design reference mission (DRM). Also, the analysis 
determined that two Littoral Combat Ships positioned near an asset, each equipped with 
16 terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD) launchers and missiles, using the 
currently installed TRS-3D or Sea GIRAFFE radars, could intercept an incoming salvo of 
short range ballistic missiles and scud missiles as effectively as one Aegis equipped 
destroyer. 
An analysis of alternatives, that included system costs, is performed; this further 
reduces the number of possible solutions to one “mission package” of BMD system 
components that meet the performance threshold and LCS sea frame limitations. To 
provide insights over a range of cost and performance points, two additional variants are 
proposed. 
xix 
In retrospect, this capstone project provided new insights regarding the viability 
of the LCS in performing regional BMD missions. In this role, the LCS would defend 
tactical and strategic assets form short range ballistic missiles and scud missiles. The LCS 
is not expected to perform midcourse detection and engagement of medium and long 
range ballistic missiles from a sea based platform, as the installed power and volume 
exceeds the capabilities of the LCS. This mission role is expected to remain exclusively 
with Aegis-equipped platforms for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, further 
investigation into the use of the LCS in a BMD mission role is recommended, as the 
inventory of BMD-capable ships remains limited and will likely be stretched thinner over 
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The end of the Cold War has brought the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its once 
powerful military has shattered long-held paradigms on how conflicts in the 20th century 
were to be fought. The threat of Soviet military expansion has now been eclipsed by the 
emerging threats presented by unstable nations and non-state actors with political 
agendas not aligned with the interests of the United States and its allies. These new 
groups, with their access to Cold War-era Soviet and NATO armaments, continue to 
establish a military presence; their ability to launch and conduct armed regional conflicts 
has increased the risk of destabilizing and denying access to regions of strategic and 
tactical importance across the globe. 
With the majority of the world’s population located in coastal or near-coastal 
areas, these emerging threats are particularly concerning in the littoral regions. The 
increased likelihood as aggressor-launched attacks, ranging from ground and small 
watercraft assaults to short- and intermediate-range ballistic missile strikes have 
increased the urgency to support maritime defense missions such as anti-piracy, anti-
terrorism, and port security. 
This shift in views toward future conflicts has had several significant 
implications. American naval assets, whose Cold War mission included containment of 
Soviet military expansion efforts, were designed for the open ocean operational 
environment, i.e., blue-water. With the shift in focus to regional maritime security, Cold 
War-era naval assets were found to be inadequately suited for operation in the shallower 
coastal waters, i.e., the littorals. Independent analyses supported the notion that the U.S. 
Navy (USN) could not effectively operate in littoral environments. The USN fleet was 
simply too big to operate in these environments; while many foreign navies had a class of 
ship in the 3,000 ton displacement range, the USN did not have a widely deployed 
platform smaller than the 4,200 ton Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigate. In 




many countries (even allies) were opposed to allowing larger, nuclear-powered surface 
combatants into territorial waters. 
Considering the high cost of construction of large surface combatants, and even 
higher operation and maintenance costs, the U.S. Navy proposed the fielding of a new, 
smaller platform that could quickly adapt to a multitude of global threats. However, given 
that there were so many potential mission areas under the new role envisioned by the 
U.S. Navy, it became quickly apparent that the only way a single platform could perform 
such a role is by incorporating an open architecture allowing for modular “mission 
modules” that could be rapidly exchanged to reconfigure the ship’s primary  
mission (PMS 420, 2012).  
Many mission packages (reconfigurable mission modules combined with the 
ships core and auxiliary capabilities) were investigated by the USN and the defense 
industrial base, but only three were commissioned with the initial “Flight-0” Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS); Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 
and Mine-Countermeasure (MCM) (United States Navy, 2012).   
While these first flight Navy programs address a number of threats to maritime 
security, the current mission packages do not address the threat of theater based ballistic 
missile attacks. As mentioned, the proliferation of Cold War era armaments has not only 
increased the risk of attacks upon littoral region assets by land-borne or sea-borne 
aggressors; it has also increased aggressor access to short and intermediate range ballistic 
missiles such that ballistic missile attacks are now recognized as a viable threat to these 
assets. This paper discusses an exploration into the viability of the LCS in serving a 
littoral region ballistic missile defense (BMD) mission role, and proposes a concept-level 





A. LCS BACKGROUND 
At the International Seapower Symposium at the U.S. Naval War College on 
October 17, 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations introduced a document titled A 
Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower. This document defined the United 
States Navy’s newest maritime strategy by outlining six functional naval capabilities 
(United States Navy); 
 Forward presence 
 Deterrence 
 Sea control 
 Power projection 
 Maritime security 
 Humanitarian assistance/disaster response 
A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower is a follow-on to the legacy 
Sea Power 21 vision. Sea Power 21 was released in October 2003 in an effort to make the 
Navy “more flexible and agile to effectively meet future threats” (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2003). The strategy focuses on three independent projections of power; Sea 
Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea Basing respectively aiming to project Global Defensive 
Assurance, Precise and Persistent Offensive Power, and Joint Operational Independence. 
The Littoral Combat Ship was the first true development effort to adhere to the 
model presented by the Sea Power 21 vision. An independent report presented in 2002 by 
the Naval Postgraduate School exemplifies the LCS as a model of the Sea Power 21 
initiative. The study shows that LCS’s reconfigurable mission module capability of the 
LCS enables both the power projection and logistics missions contributing to the Sea 




However, a decade later, after two littoral combat ships have been commissioned, 
the outlook has changed significantly. Whereas the original CONOPS envisioned LCS as 
a replacement for aging frigates, minesweepers and patrol boats, within the Fleet, 
operational assessment quickly concludes that capability restrictions prevents the LCS 
from fulfilling most of the fleet missions envisioned in Sea Power 21 and required by A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.  
Furthermore, Navy leadership was not eager to reduce the size of the fleet or 
compromise on the individual capabilities awarded by the classes of ship that the LCS 
was slated to replace. Cost over-runs, capability gaps, and unpopular perception 
throughout the fleet have been the subject of criticism and increased scrutiny of the LCS 
program with both Congress and the acquisition community. However, it is important to 
note that the acquisition community (NAVSEA) has publically feuded with congressional 
leadership and independent testing organizations over some of the negative findings 
concerning the LCS’s perceived cost and performance. 
Operational testing quickly showed that the LCS excelled in some mission areas, 
while failing to successfully perform some of the core mission areas in their concept of 
operations. When compared to the six elements of the Cooperative Strategy for the 21st 
Century Seapower, the LCS was found competent in the areas of deterrence, maritime 
security, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response. However, it was deemed 
incapable of possessing forward presence, sea control, or power projection requirements.   
The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Mark Ferguson ordered a review 
assessment of LCS to include war gaming scenarios and other aspects of operational 
analysis. The output report (hereby known as the OPNAV report) was released by RDML 
Samuel Perez. While the OPNAV report is classified, secondary sources cite issues 
including the concept of operations, manning shortages, maintenance and training 
concerns, modularity and mission module issues, and commonality problems between the 




The OPNAV report continues to address shortfalls with the mission module 
concept, highlighting concerns regarding the manning, logistics, and sustainment of the 
reconfigurable mission module concept. Other sources have cited flaws with the LCS’s 
mission module system integration and inability to meet established  
requirements (Eckstein, 2013). Conversely, this claim has been publically refuted by the 
PEO LCS organization and has been a frustration to acquisition officials (PMS 420, 
2012). 
In short, the OPNAV report, as well as additional, independent observations, state 
that the LCS cannot perform to its intended mission requirements due to its extended 
length of time required to reconfigure mission packages, its lack of power projection, 
control, and forward presence, and its shortcomings in managing the complexities of 
OCONUS deployment and support. 
B. EMERGING A2/AD PROBLEM 
In the 2012 DoD Strategic Guidance, the president identified Anti-Access/Area 
Denial (A2/AD) as a chief concern in maintaining global security (Defense, 2012). The 
nature of many of the oil ports and shipping waterways is such that a small force could 
effectively shut down all incoming and outgoing sea traffic using rudimentary, 
inexpensive, and widely available weapons, such as mines and scud missiles.   
The existing mission modules and the sea frame of the LCS were designed toward 
performance of counter A2/AD missions with an initial focus on Mine Countermeasures 
(MCM) and Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). These mission packages were 
intended to filled capability gaps as U.S. frigates and MCM ships were retired, as 
mentioned in the previous section. But as current and potential adversaries acquire and 
expand A2/AD capabilities to include concentrated missile attacks, a missile defense 
mission capability must be introduced. U.S. strategic and tactical assets, such as bases, 
ports, and international waterways in the littoral regions are becoming increasingly 




1. Potential Threats 
The A2/AD missile threat was assessed for several potential adversaries ranging 
from the topical look at capabilities currently possessed by North Korea to hypothetical 
possibilities in Yemen. For the purpose of this project, the scope was bounded to consider 
the ballistic and scud missile threats not already covered by missile defense systems. An 
assumption was made that countries having long range and intercontinental missiles 
would continue to have committed defenses, such as the European Phase Adaptive 
Approach or the U.S.’s Ground-Based Midcourse Interceptor system.   
In examining the A2/AD environment and, more broadly, the possible capability 
gaps in missile defense, a common, likely scenario would be that civil conflicts result in 
an unpredictable missile threat. This would be especially harmful in areas where U.S. and 
allied ballistic missile defense capabilities do not fully cover, which include Libya and 
Syria.   
A review of the inventories of the most likely countries indicated that an 
inventory of 50 to 60 missiles having ranges between 200 and 800 km would be likely, 
and that these countries may have half as many launchers (Abby Doll, 2012).  Table 1 
shows missile inventories of Syria and Libya. Although many other countries could 
present this threat, a Design Reference Mission based on these inventories provides 






Syrian Missile Inventory 
Missile Range Missile 
SS-21 120 km 18+ 
Scud-B 300 km 
38+ Scud-C 500 km 
Scud-D 700 km 
Libyan Missile Inventory 
Missile Range Missile 
Al Fatah 200 km 
45+ 
Scud-B 300 km 










III. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A. BMD BACKGROUND AND CAPABILITY GAP 
Weapons proliferation has been a long-standing concern for the United States 
Government, even prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In order to finance an 
ongoing campaign and protect allied interests, both the U.S. and USSR provided 
weaponry to neighboring nations in return for monetary or strategic compensation. 
Unfortunately, this has led to the present day situation where many unstable nations, as 
well as non-state actors, have access to advance weaponry. Terrorist organizations, 
regime opposition groups, and regional war lords have demonstrated their willingness to 
use these weapons on their enemies, or even on innocent civilian population centers. 
Given that these weapons, while advanced, are many generations behind the state 
of the art capabilities that our nation’s military is best equipped to counter, there are 
many capability gaps in the U.S. response strategy. One of the largest threats exists in the 
short to medium range ballistic missiles operated by many middle-eastern, African, and 
east-Asian countries. These weapons, while rarely nuclear capable, can contain explosive, 
chemical, radiological, or biological compounds. However, given the wide-spread nature 
of these threats and their relative inaccessibility, response tactics are limited. 
Furthermore, the diversion of defense-capable assets often puts the U.S. at risk for 
additional threats. 
B. LITTORAL BMD CHALLENGE 
Considering that over 50% of the world’s population lives within 60 kilometers of 
the shoreline, it is easy to believe that many of the abovementioned threats are near the 
littorals. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. has a recognized capability gap in the littoral 
regions, including the inability to easily intercept locally targeted ballistic missile threats. 




agreed upon that a littoral-capable ballistic missile defense platform is needed to ensure 
global maritime security. 
Operating in the littoral environment requires special consideration to 
geographical constraints and increased air and sea traffic. Radar clutter, resulting from 
commercial air and sea traffic, affect detection and classification times and ultimately 
limit the number of engagements a system can have on an incoming threat. Furthermore, 
geographical features of the landmass can block radar and prevent even the possibility of 
early detection. A sea based ballistic missile defense system design must tackle these 
challenges to be effective in littoral combat. 
1. Problem Statement 
With the advancement and expansion of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) 
capabilities of current and potential adversaries, strategic assets (e.g., bases, ports, littoral 
regions) of the U.S. are becoming increasingly vulnerable to threats, especially 
concentrated missile attacks, that will either deny access to or limit ability to conduct 
operations from them. This, combined with the resource-constrained challenges faced by 
the armed forces, may ultimately compromise the United States’ ability to project power 
and protect its interests in contested regions. 
2. Capability Need Statement 
To counter the increasing threat posed by the expansion of adversary A2/AD 
capabilities, an improved and economical BMD capability is needed to protect U.S./allied 
regional strategic assets against concentrated missile attacks which play a key role in 





A. CAPSTONE PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The capstone assignment was to identify a capability need that the LCS could 
perform effectively, and design a concept mission package to meet that need. Theater 
Ballistic Missile Defense was identified as the capability need. The design objective was 
to develop an LCS mission package concept capable of protecting regional strategic 
assets from concentrated missile attacks. The Systems Engineering methodology was 
used to derive the functional requirements, develop the concept, and assess the design’s 
feasibility. 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
The ballistic missile defense mission affects a large range of stakeholders. A high 
level assessment was done to understand the scope of these affects and to also identify 
where design requirements and guidance should come from. 
In the beginning of this capstone project, several stakeholders within NAVSEA 
and the Program Executive Offices (PEO) were surveyed to understand the demand and 
to get some direction. Ultimately, the capability need was derived from the Defense 
Strategic Guidance and several Congressional Research Service reports. Further direction 
was provided by the Naval Postgraduate School capstone advisors and LCS requirements 
were pulled from the Interface Control Document.  Table 2 ties stakeholders with their 




Table 2: High-Level Stakeholder Analysis 
Stakeholder Role Interest 
NAVSEA 
PEO LCS 
PMS 501 Littoral 
Combat Ship Program 
Office 
PMS 420 LCS 
Mission Modules 
Program Office 
Planning/architecture Delivery of system  meeting capability 
need 
DoD 
Secretary of Defense 
Missile Defense 
Agency 
System acquisition Acquisition of system(s) meeting 
capability needs 
U.S. Navy 








Lockheed Martin  
General Dynamics 
Develop/build/deliver Deliver mission-capable system within 
budget / schedule 
Allied/Coalition 
Forces 
BMD presence/partner Mutual protection of strategic and 
tactical assets 
Host Nations Host presence of BMD 
assets 
Ensure solution(s) can be implemented 
without escalating concerns of 
neighboring countries or other interests 
Taxpayers Funding support of 
project 
Funds are efficiently spent to provide 





C. MISSION OBJECTIVES 
1. Primitive Needs 
In a 2009 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report titled Sea-Based Ballistic 
Missile Defense – Background and Issues for Congress it was reported there are over 
5900 ballistic missiles outside the U.S., NATO, Russian Federation, and Peoples 
Republic of China (O'Rourke). Short and medium range ballistic missiles make up 99% 
of the aforementioned inventory. The findings suggest that many lesser-developed 
countries are in possession of these weapons; the majority of which are in areas not 
covered by any ballistic missile defense systems. Asset availability and geopolitical 
constraints make staging defense systems for all possible threats infeasible. 
Currently, the U.S. Navy has 26 Aegis BMD systems and six more are planned to 
be in service by FY17. The 2020 European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) 
commitment will require 4–5 Aegis equipped ships on station around Europe. As the 
Ticonderoga Class cruisers are retired over the coming years and as demand for ballistic 
missile defense increases, the Aegis equipped destroyer could be stretched too thin to 
respond to missile threats in underdeveloped areas of the globe. 
According to the FY13 Shipbuilding Plan, 55 Littoral Combatant Ships will be 
operational by 2026 (Operations, 2012). The open architecture design of the LCS sea 
frame allows the ship to be fitted with mission package components required for the 
mission demand. Packages for Surface Warfare, Antisubmarine Warfare, and Mine 
Warfare are currently being fielded. A BMD mission package is needed to meet future 
ballistic missile threats and fill gaps in ballistic missile defense coverage. 
2. System Design Objectives 
The design objective of this project was to apply the Systems Engineering 
methodology to develop a BMD LCS mission package concept. Design metrics and 




measures using publicly available information to rank system components and determine 
those most suited to fill the capability need. The final deliverable is this report describing 
a BMD mission package concept that leverages current and future assets to provide a 
cost-effective, scalable, and flexible BMD system for defending strategic and tactical 
assets in littoral regions of interest. 
D. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
To reiterate, the purpose of this project was to develop a solution that could be 
rapidly deployed in response to threats to high value assets in more underdeveloped 
countries that are armed with short range ballistic missiles and scud missiles. It was 
determined that 50 to 60 missiles having ranges between 200 and 800 km would be 
likely, and that a salvo of 24 missiles launched at a single asset would be feasible. These 
metrics were used to establish the Design Reference Mission. From a sea based platform, 
defending a land based asset from a missile threat further inland is done more effectively 
within closer proximity to the asset. This puts the platform in the littoral environment. 
1. Projected Operational Environment 
Ballistic missile defense of an asset requires the system to operate close enough to 
allow sufficient intercept opportunities of missiles coming from any direction. From a sea 
based platform, this often demands that the system be deep within the littoral waters of 
the asset’s host country and sometimes within the littorals of the threat country. Several 
regions have been identified, based on recent events, as having higher likelihoods of 
needing ballistic missile defense. These were described previously in the Capability-Need 
Assessment, and further in the Mission Execution Scenario section of the DRM. The 
environmental conditions and threats prominent in these regions (and specifically the 






 Environmental Conditions 
o Littoral Waters 
 Geographical constraints lead to limited battle space, 
congestion, and clutter resulting in reduced reaction time to 
incoming threats. 
 Higher sea states demand higher sensor fidelity and active 
tracking to discriminate contacts on the surface and in the air. 
o Targeted Regions 
 Temperatures range from below 0° F near the Korean 
Peninsula to over 100° F in the Middle East.  
 The geography is sometimes flat, but other times it is 
mountainous, limiting detection time and thus reducing 
response time. 
 Threat/Target Details 
o Threat Characterization 
 The strategic assets identified in the capability-need analysis 
are those that are not currently under the defense umbrella of 
some other defense system, or those with insufficient coverage. 
The threat regions are typically using shorter range ballistic 
missiles with 1000 kg warheads. These are up to 12 km in 
length and 1 m in width.  Table 3 shows the flight 
characteristics these missile types. 
o Threat Tactics 
 Quantity 
 Research into potential threats posed by weapons 
capabilities of foreign countries found that a maximum 
inventory of 60 missiles is likely and a maximum salvo launch 





 Direction  
 If the threat country recognized that the sea-based 
defense system was the only defense system in place, 
then that country would try to launch from a location, 
or several locations that would minimized the system’s 
coverage. 
 Range 
 As described in previous sections, the threat country 
would likely possess short range ballistic missiles that 
have a range between 100 and 800 km.  Table 3 shows 
the flight characteristics of the prospective missiles 
(Bardanis, 2004). 
 
Table 3: Threat Missile Flight Characteristics 
a. Mission Execution Scenario 1  
In the DRM, civil conflicts in a neutral country threaten U.S. assets near 
Benghazi, Libya. Intel indicates that the radicals possess short range ballistic missiles and 
scud missiles and intend to use them. The U.S. positions sea based BMD systems to 
defend U.S. assets. Libyan radicals launch 24 ballistic missiles simultaneously from three 
different launch sites ranging from 180 km to 700 km. U.S. forces engage incoming 
















200 198.0 1.27 50 21.73 27.70 21.33 
400 280.0 1.80 100 29.63 38.54 29.65 
600 342.9 2.20 150 37.37 49.38 37.97 





Figure 1: Design Reference Scenario 
The operational concept starts with positioning the BMDS equipped 
Littoral Combat Ship(s) to an optimal location to defend the strategic or tactical asset. In 
the event multiple systems are deployed, they will exchange information as needed. Then 
a somewhat conventional detect to engage cycle begins. The BMDS scans the air space, 
tracks contacts, detects missiles, controls the engagement, and intercepts the missile.  









V. REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION 
A. APPROACH 
In the initial approach to determining ballistic missile defense success metrics, 
public sources, such as the MDA website, were explored. A focus was placed on finding 
performance requirements for the Aegis and the Patriot air defense systems. Missile and 
defense system characteristics were compiled, but none of the sources provided any 
specific level of performance requirements. 
The approach then shifted to a more analogous assessment in which the Aegis and 
Patriot Advanced Capability systems were simulated in the Design Reference Mission, 
and the measure of effectiveness of those systems was the design requirement of the LCS 
BMD system. The approach required two high level steps. 
1. Determine how effectively the existing solution(s) can perform the DRM (Aegis 
and PAC3) 
2. Determine what is required of the LCS to perform the DRM at least as effectively 
1. System Considerations 
The feasibility of this LCS BMD package concept leaned heavily on several 
considerations and assumptions. A description of how the capability need for a BMD 
mission package was determined was given in previous sections, but the bottom line is 
that it is not practical to dedicate a large share of the Aegis platforms capability to “asset 
protection” when only a fraction of capability is needed. In a time when LCS platforms 
are abundant (as projected), the Navy should leverage these lower-cost solutions to 




2. Key Assumptions 
A few key assumptions were necessary to move forward with the system design. 
First, as expressed in the Approach section, the sea based Aegis system represents the 
best capability to date, and meets the Navy’s requirements for ballistic missile defense on 
a sea based platform. 
Next, the Navy will continue to build the LCS; 55 ships are planned to be in 
service by 2026. The modular architecture of the LCS allows the Navy to fit components 
for the mission in demand. 
Last, publicly sourced information is sufficient for proving the concept at this 
stage. Because this concept design study is a feasibility analysis, published data was used 
in characterizing the system; therefore, the performance characteristics are not of the 
highest fidelity. The quantitative requirements that will be used in the design were 
derived from performance metrics of the Aegis and PAC3 systems in the simulated 
DRM. 
B. HIGH-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
1. Project Requirements 
The customer-defined requirement, or capstone assignment, was to identify a 
capability need (mission) that the Littoral Combat Ship could perform effectively, and 
design a concept mission package to meet that need. 
2. Derived Requirements 
The LCS mission package design shall increase layered BMD capability to enable 
cost-effective, rapidly established protection of an expanded range of littoral-area 





a. Cost  
The BMD equipped LCS shall cost considerably less than the seagoing 
Aegis solution price of ~$2B per unit (Office of Management and Budget, 2013). The 
cost goal used for this analysis is at least two BMD capable LCS platforms can be 
procured for the cost of a single Aegis-BMD destroyer. 
Again, an assumption was made that the Aegis system meets the 
performance requirements of the sea based BMD solution. In future threat projections, if 
it was determined with a high certainty that the Ballistic Missile (BM) threat on strategic 
and tactical assets has the highest priority, then the force structure plan might be modified 
to meet this demand. If the Aegis solution was the most cost effective, then the LCS 
solution could become obsolete, largely because the Aegis is a multipurpose system. 
Therefore, for the LCS solution to be considered, the cost should be considerably less 
than the seagoing Aegis solution. 
b. Technical 
The BMD systems modules shall integrate with the Littoral Combat Ship 
architecture. The open architecture design of the LCS is such that mission packages can 
be easily and quickly installed to meet the mission demands. The LCS Interface Control 
Document (ICD) identifies the requirements for mission module integration. Deviations 
from the ICD negate the open architecture concept. For this solution to be mission 
package, it must meet the requirements given in the ICD. This document is distribution 
limited, so for this study, broad ranges of values are used. An assessment of weight or 
center of gravity was not performed, but future efforts should address the weight 
requirements at each mission module station. 
(1) Space: The current monohull variant of the LCS has two 
weapons module stations, and the trimaran has three, each with about 50 cubic meters of 





(2) Power: The available power on the LCS sea frame at any 
single mission module station is less than 50 kW. However, studies have been performed 
that suggest that 1 MW of power could be installed easily and as much as 10 MW may be 
possible using portable generators 
c. Performance 
The solution, when properly deployed, will provide BMD capability at 
least as effectively as the sea based Aegis system when measured against the salvo and 





VI. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
A. TAILORED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
To guide the BMDS systems engineering effort a tailored Vee model was used, 
based on the Forsberg and Mooz Systems Engineering Entity Vee (Forsberg & Mooz, 
2005) (Figure 3). With project time constrained to a span of three academic quarters and 
limited dedicated resources, the project scope was bounded to developing and proposing 
an LCS-based BMD system concept only. i.e., primary focus was on synthesizing and 
proposing a cost effective, force-structure aligned concept solution that would fulfill 
BMD capability needs in littoral waters. 
 




The systems engineering process focused on activities in the upper left corner of 
the Vee model, which emphasizes the front-end phases of the systems engineering life 
cycle, including requirements development, functional analysis and decomposition which 
lead to the definition of the architectures and concept design. The resulting process used, 




































Figure 4: BDMS Concept Development Tailored Vee Model 
B. SYSTEM CONTEXT MODEL 
The context model for the proposed LCS-based BMD system is shown in 
Appendix A. Context Model for LCS BMD System. This system is envisioned to operate 




Control (C2) or other coalition BMD assets operating within the theater. The key 
interacting systems include the following: 
1. Sensors 
Detection of an incoming ballistic missile can be accomplished via a variety of 
means ranging from very simple approaches, e.g., an observer equipped with binoculars 
or night-vision goggles, to more sophisticated methods, including radar and satellites e.g., 
the space-based infrared system (SBIRS). For maximum BMD system effectiveness, 
detection of incoming ballistic missiles as early as possible will be needed to maximize 
the amount of time the system will have to react to the incoming missile, system reaction 
time to track, determine course of action, and intercept the missile before it is able to 
reach its intended target to inflict damage and/or casualties. This will require leverage of 
use of more sophisticated sensors which can readily be integrated into the overall system 
to enable prompt notification of potential missile threats. 
2. Combat Management System (CMS) 
On a naval combat ship, the CMS facilitates the collaboration of human (crew) 
and non-human actors (CMS system, sensors, and actuators) to perform three of the 
ship’s main functions, including C2, war fighting, and planning. Dr. Skowronek and Mr. 
Van’t Hag note that, 
The Naval CMS systems’ main capabilities encompass awareness of 
situation around the ship (or a group of ships: a naval force) using sensors, 
recognition of threats against the ship or force and response to those 
threats using actuators such as missile and gun systems. Other capabilities 
of a Naval CMS include those frequently called Command Support 
capabilities, and which in general are concerned with preparation of the 
ship’s mission. They also include the preparation and supervision of 
execution of diverse plans, as well as reception and interpretation of 
communication from external parties (other vessels or shore-based 
parties). (Van’t Hag & Skowronek, 23–24 September 2002) 
As such, execution of the BMD mission on the LCS-based system is expected to be 





Neutralization of ballistic missile threats is expected to be accomplished primarily 
by anti-ballistic missiles, either LCS-based or otherwise-based, designed specifically to 
counter BM threats. While there are other methods or technologies available e.g., Close-
In Weapon System (CIWS), directed-energy weapons, cursory assessments indicate that 
these solutions do not appear viable due to constraints including effective range and 
supportability (i.e., power requirements). 
4. Support Infrastructure 
Support BMD system include all elements needed to enable setup, operation, and 
maintenance and repair to ensure the system can fulfill its mission throughout its life 
cycle. Elements include, all transportation systems to deliver and transport the system to, 
from, and around the theater of operation, all personnel required to sustain the system, as 
well as all infrastructure needed for system operation. In the context of the LCS-based 





VII. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) 
The functional decomposition for the DRM mission set was used to derive MOEs 
for the LCS BMD solution. The intent of determining MOEs for this analysis was to bind 
the problem space for subsequent system engineering design synthesis.  Table 4 is a list 
of MOE for the LCS BMD Mission Package and breaks the MOE into two categories of 
Measures of Performance (MoP) and Measures of Suitability (MoS) (Prothero, 2010). 
 
MOE Notes/Justification MoP MoS 
Operation 
Availability 
Ability to maintain BMD capability given DRM environment   
Operational 
Reliability (R) 
Characteristics that promote successful operation within DRM 






The total time the system needs to be taken down for 




The total personnel required to be deployed on the LCS to 
operate BMD Mission Package 
  
System Cost The Life-Cycle Cost for the LCS BMD Mission Package   
System Size The ability for the system to fit within the LCS modular 











Probability that a missile of DRM parameters is detected   
Range of 
Detection   
Range that that a missile of DRM parameters is detected   
Probability of 
Track 
Probability that a missile of DRM parameters is Tracked   
Range of Track Range that that a missile of DRM parameters is Tracked   
Probability of 
Kill (PK) 
Probability that a missile of DRM parameters is destroyed if 
engaged 
  
Range of Engage Range that ballistic missiles can be engaged   




B. KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS (KPP)  
The attributes of system performance that shape the LCS BMD capability within 
the DRM operating environment are the KPPs, listed in Table 5. The KPP were 
developed based on modeling and simulation work or information provided by similar 
systems. 
 
Table 5: Key Performance Parameters 
BMD system requirements were developed in step using Model Based SE 
Methods. After gathering all the system needs and requirements from the stakeholders as 
well as simulation, brainstorming sessions were held to align requirement content 
considered essential to system development. Subsequent analyses enabled final 
downselect and elimination of requirements considered unnecessary. Next, requirements 
were into Functional and Non-Functional groupings at the upper level of the system 
requirements taxonomy. The end result was a listing of requirements structured via a 
CORE model (Figure 5). 
C. REQUIREMENTS DECOMPOSITION 
The Functional requirements of the BMD System were sub-categorized into: 
1.1 Input Requirements – command input from the user or control and 
command. 
KPP Threshold  Objective  
Operational Availability (A0) 0.90 0.95 
Probability Of Raid Annihilation (Pra)  0.55 0.75 
Probability of Detection  0.90 0.96 
Range of Detection   180 km 300 km 
Probability of Track  0.90 0.96 
Range of Track  180 km 300 km 
Probability of Kill (PK) 0.80 0.96 




1.2 Output Requirements – should generate system or mission information e.g., 
battle damage assessment.  
1.3 Interface Requirements – the system artifacts should function within the 
operational environment. 
1.4 BMDS Function Requirements – describe the system functionality. 
 
Correspondingly, Non-Functional Requirements were sub-categorized into: 
2.1 Suitability Requirements – operational and maintenance intervals should 
support mission needs. 
2.2 Physical Requirements – system size, weight, center of gravity, etc., shall be 
defined. 
2.3 Technology Requirements – system shall be able to upgrade to newer 
technology in the future. 
2.4 Standards and Protocol Requirements – system shall prescribe to current 
operational doctrine and constraints. 
2.5 Cost Requirements – system shall be within the expected cost. 






Figure 5: High level of requirements model 
For further analysis, each sub-category was decomposed into sets of lower-tier 
functions. For instance, the functional requirements were decomposed into; Scanning, 
Tracking, Detection, Control and Threat Intercept Requirements (Figure 6). This process 
was repeated for all high level requirements. From this view point, every requirement 
will turn into a system or sub-system function and integrated together later. A detailed list 
of all requirements can be found in Appendix E. System Requirements. 
 





VIII. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
With system requirements defined, development of the BMD system architectures 
began. Synthesis of the architectures was accomplished in steps, starting with use of the 
system functional requirements, system operational concept, and system context model to 
synthesize the high level functional architecture of the BMDS. This high-level structure 
was then decomposed into sets of lower-tier sub functions, and the resulting functional 
hierarchy was then transformed into the BMDS functional architecture and subsequent 
candidate BMDS physical architectures to be evaluated in the project Analysis of 
Alternatives. Specific details regarding the development of the BMDS functional and 
physical architectures are provided in the subsequent sections. 
Since the focus of this project is to propose an LCS-based BMD mission package 
concept, the functional and physical architectures have been developed only to the levels 
of granularity needed to support concept development. 
A. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
1. Functional Decomposition 
The BMDS functional architecture, which expresses specifically what the BMD 
system does in performing its mission, started with a first-order decomposition of the top 
level function, perform ballistic missile defense, into the key activities conducted by the 
system. The BMD system functional requirements, operational concept, and system 
context model were considered to decompose the top-level system functional context 
(Figure 7) into the following five “key” functions. 
1.0 Scan – Continuously monitor the air space for any changes that may indicate an 
incoming BM. 
2.0 Track – Continuously monitor and status potential BM threats. 




4.0 Control – Determine course(s) of action. 
5.0 Engage – Schedule and deploy weapon(s) to neutralize the threat 
 
Figure 7: BMD System Functional Context – Top Level  
Using the first-level functional hierarchy, decomposition of each of the key 
functions was then performed to further define the lower level activities required. The 
resulting hierarchy from the first and second order functional decomposition is provided 





Figure 8: BMD System Functional Hierarchy Architecture 
With the key and sub-level functions identified from the functional 
decomposition, relationships between the functions were established to yield the 
functional architecture. With the first level decomposition, a first level functional 
architecture was established by defining the interactive relationships existing between the 
5 key functions. The resulting functional architecture, expressed in IDEF0 format in 
Figure 9, shows the relationships between the key functions in terms of inputs, outputs, 
controls, and mechanisms. This process is continued at the next level of the hierarchy 






Figure 9: BMD First Level Functional Architecture – IDEF0 Format 
 





Figure 11: Example Lower Level BMD Functional Architecture Detail  
B. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
1. Function Allocation 
With the system functions defined, determination of the BMD system physical 
architecture started with mapping the system functions to the primary system elements 
previously established and documented (sensors, combat management system, etc.) in the 
system context model. This mapping is shown as elements in Table 6. Although support 
of the BMD system is second-order function within the BMD system operation (i.e., it is 
not a key function during performance of the BMD mission), the support activities are 
essential in ensuring that all elements of the BMDs are functioning as expected to 




Table 6: System Function Allocation 
2. Physical Architecture – Components 
In developing the BMD physical architecture, solution components and 
subsystems were then researched and identified for potential inclusion as solution 
concept elements. With both functional requirements (e.g., scanning and detecting) and 
non-functional requirements (e.g., cost, supportability, and integration) in consideration, 
a cursory list of these components was generated for the sensor system, the CMS, and the 
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   Receive Fire Control Solution 
  
X  
   Denote Weapon 
  
X  
   Prepare Weapon   X  
   Execute Engagement   X  
   Initialize Weapon System   X  
Support Infrastructure    X 




With the project objective focused on proposal of an LCS-based BMD mission 
package, selection of candidate components were biased toward compatibility with the 
LCS sea frame and its supporting infrastructure. 
However, in further developing of an LCS-based BMD system from a system of 
systems viewpoint it may be possible to also leverage non-LCS based elements, such as 
satellite feeds or alternate interceptor assets existing in the theater of operations, as part 
of the physical architecture. The resulting list of LCS-based and non-LCS-based 
candidate components, along with the high-level considerations used for selection, is 








































LCS Sea frame Integration 
Aegis Integration 
Target Tracking Capacity 










LCS Sea frame Integration 



























3. Physical Architecture – Types, Variants 
With the initial functional mapping complete and candidate system components 
identified, efforts were then shifted to development of the candidate physical 
architectures of the LCS-based BMD system. Initial efforts focused on defining BMDS 
architecture arrangements where all system elements, e.g., sensors, CMS, and 
interceptors, were located on and integrated with the LCS sea frame. This baseline 
architecture, denoted as the Type 1 architecture is depicted in Appendix C. Physical 
Architecture. This figure expresses the physical architecture in terms of the original 
system context model, elaborated with candidate solution elements for each subsystem. 
From this basis, a wide range of combinations of sensors, CMS, and interceptors were 
generated as Type 1 physical architecture variants that were considered in the Analysis of 
Alternatives. 
In developing the candidate architectures, it was acknowledged that with the 
present constraints of the LCS sea frame, non-LCS-based resources may be needed to 
compensate for any function or capability gaps that may be discovered as assessment of 
LCS-only solution progressed. To address potential challenges, a Type 2 architecture, 
which leverages non-LCS-based elements to augment the LCS-specific capability, was 
also developed. This Type 2 architecture, which integrates the capability of non-LCS-
based sensors (e.g., satellites, other forward-deployed radar) and interceptors, is shown in 
Appendix C. Physical Architecture 
Again, from this basis, a wide range of Type 2 candidate physical architecture 
variants could be identified for consideration in an Analysis of Alternatives. However, 










IX. RISK MANAGEMENT 
A risk management process was defined early in the project to systematically 
classify, assess, and prioritize actions to address risks as they were identified over the 
course of the project. This process was then implemented to decrease the effects of 
potential program issues such as increased program cost, delays, defects, and customer 
dissatisfaction. The risk management architecture used to identify, assess, handle and 
monitor each of the risks is shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Risk Management Architecture 
The planning component of the risk management architecture focuses on 
assessment of a potential risk, how to handle the risk and how to monitor/report each of 
the risks. The assessment component focuses on prioritization of the risks and selection 




to mitigate the risks. Lastly, the monitoring/reporting component deals with providing 
continuous feedback for further planning and adjustment to changing risks or newly 
discovered risks as the project matured. In the next sections each of the components of 
the risk management architecture are discussed and show how the risks for the project 
were developed. 
A. RISK IDENTIFICATION AND PLANNING 
The initial efforts identified the potential risks of integrating BMDS components 
on an LCS platform. These risks are those that can potentially prevent the project from 
achieving the intended mission. 
The risk assessment not only focused on the technical risks of system integration 
but also on the operational and programmatic risks such as cost, schedule, environmental 
conditions, vulnerabilities, and safety. 
Historical, programmatic, and publicly available data, along with the derived 
system requirements were used to identify the potential risks of the project. Project team 
meetings were held over the course of the investigation to brainstorm anticipated risks 
and discuss newly discovered risks based on new information gathered as the project 
progressed. 
The identified risks were categorized as technical, programmatic and operational.  
Table 8 represents the risks that the project may encounter due to the baseline technical 
requirements of the project in comparison of the LCS sea frame requirements and the 
prospects of programmatic limitations such as cost, congressional decisions, and 
international cooperation. 
B. RISK ASSESSMENT 
The risks identified in Table 8 were given a qualitative rating on the probability of 
occurrence and the level of consequence. The risks were then characterized as a product 




The operational risks identified deal with the hazards the LCS may encounter 
while performing the DRM. Operational risk 1 (O1) identifies that the crew size of the 
LCS may need to be increased to a level not supported by the LCS in order to 
successfully perform the DRM. The addition of a BMD capable radar, BMD control 
console, and missile launch system will require additional crew expertise and manpower 
to perform the DRM while potentially surpassing the crew size of the other mission 
packages. Operational risk 2 (O2) identifies concerns regarding the duration of the DRM. 
The maximum demonstrated at sea duration period for LCS-1 is approximately 21 days. 
The DRM may require the LCS to be in littoral waters for longer periods in order to 
monitor potential launches or incoming missiles. Operational risk 3 (O3) deals with the 
Level I+ survivability rating of the LCS. The Level I+ survivability rating is the lowest 
rating of a combat ship, meaning the LCS is not survivable in a combat environment. The 
DRM requires the LCS to hover in littoral waters where it will most likely be immersed 
in a combat environment. Operational risk 4 (O4) deals with the operational readiness of 
the LCS due to insufficient configuration management and product road mapping. Due to 
the schedule constraints of the project, the alternatives chosen for the LCS mission 
package will be modified COTS equipment limiting the configuration management and 
product road mapping of the chosen equipment. 
The programmatic/project risks identified center on the budget constraints, 
political roadblocks and the physical limitations the project may encounter. Program risk 
1 (P1) is based off the congressional reports (O'Rourke, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile 
Defense—Background and Issues for Congress, 2009) where the LCS is criticized on 
mission effectiveness and the potential of reducing the planned fleet of 55. Reduction or 
even cancellation of the fleet will place the LCS BMD mission package project in 
jeopardy. The LCS will not be able to support the mission package proposal due to 
resource constraints. Program risk 2 (P2) deals with cost deviation due to the use of new 
technology or the modification of COTS items in order for them to integrate onto the 
LCS frame. Program risk 3 (P3) deals with the integration of BMD capable missiles onto 




ground based or on a larger ship frame, integrating them on to the LCS may cause 
structural damage to the frame. Program risk 4 (P4) addresses the political risks when 
operating in the littoral waters of adversaries or friendly/neutral nations. Agreements 
must be set forward with friendly nations, or the LCS must be able to withstand a combat 
environment and or political pressures in non-friendly waters.   
The technical risks identified deal with the integration and interoperability of 
equipment and the technical limitations that may be encountered when integrating into 
the LCS framework. Technical risk 1 (T1) focuses on the technical maturity of the LCS. 
The LCS is still being vetted as the two variants are still under evaluation. 
Underperformance of the LCS (not meeting expected requirements) may hinder the LCS 
in accomplishing the DRM. Technical risk 2 (T2) pertains to the use of higher powered 
radars for the monitoring, detection and tracking of ballistic missiles. The higher powered 
radars require higher voltages and current that the LCS framework cannot provide. 
Technical risk 3 (T3) deals with the integration and interoperability of LCS and the 
mission package with the BMD systems. Technical risk 4 (T4) describes the issue of 
using COTS items for the mission package. As mentioned due to schedule constraints 
COTS items will be used to make up the mission package. The COTS items will require 
modification that may not be attainable in order to perform the mission. Technical risk 5 
(T5) reflects the acquisition of a BMD capable radar. The limited pool of BMD capable 
COTS radars poses a risk on the feasibility of finding a compatible radar for the LCS sea 
frame. Technical risk 6 (T6) concerns the systems of systems concept as the LCS will be 
integrated into the worldwide BMD system, where data sharing will occur among 




Table 8: Identified Risks 
C. RISK CONSEQUENCE  
A standardized consequence metric was used for the qualitative scoring of each 
risk. Risk Consequences categories provided a qualitative measure of the worst possible 
OPERATIONAL RISKS 
O1 The crew size required for BMD operations may increase to a level 
unsupported by the LCS.  
O2 The duration of BMD missions may surpass the at sea capability of the LCS. 
O3 The Level I+ survivability capabilities of the LCS limit its ability to handle 
threats which could affect BMD mission success. 
O4 Insufficient Configuration Management and Product road mapping may 
impede the ability to perform future technology refreshes on time and per 
budget, impacting operational readiness of the LCS fleet. 
PROGRAM/PROJECT RISKS 
P1 Due to budget constraints and the criticism facing the LCS the amount of 
ships may be reduced and or even canceled putting the project in jeopardy. 
P2 Cost deviation risks may be incurred by the design due to the use of new 
technology (radars, modified missile launchers, BMD communications) 
P3 The use of BMD missile launchers on the LCS platform may cause structural 
damage to the LCS. 
P4 LCS platforms in the littoral waters of potential adversaries or friendly 
nations may be interpreted as a declaration of war or violation of territorial 
waters. 
TECHNICAL RISKS 
T1 The use of the LCS platforms to perform our missions may not be feasible as 
the technical maturity of the LCS vessel may impact performance. The LCS 
platform is essentially still being vetted. 
T2 Using higher power radars for tracking on the LCS may exceed available 
power.  
T3 Interoperability and integration of the LCS platform with BMD systems may 
not be fully achieved. 
T4 COTS equipment may have to be modified to fit on the LCS platform 
imposing a technical risk of integration. 
T5 Acquisition of a BMD capable radar for scanning, detection and tracking of 
short to medium range ballistic missiles may not be feasible. 
T6 The integration of the LCS platform with foreign BMD systems may incur 




consequence resulting from design inadequacies, environmental conditions, procedural 
deficiencies, system, subsystem, or component failure. These qualitative risk 
consequence metrics are shown in Table 9. The metric was scored with values from one 
(1) to five (5). A value of one (1) was considered to be of negligible impact and was not 
determined to be detrimental to the mission objective. A value of five (5) was considered 
as a catastrophic impact to the mission objective via effects on personnel, project, 
environmental or systems/equipment. The consequence of each risk was determined 
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Table 9: Risk Consequence Metric 
D. RISK PROBABILITY  
Risk probability level is the likelihood that associated risk will occur during 
project or system life cycle. The probability of occurrence of each of the identified risks 
was expressed qualitatively. The qualitative probability metrics was scored with values 
from one (1) to five (5). Value one (1) represents the probability of occurrence as being 
improbable with a less than 20% chance of occurrence and value five (5) represents a 
frequent occurrence with a probability of occurrence equal or greater than 80%. The 




The probability of occurrence for each of the risks was estimated through research of 
public information, historical data of the LCS, stakeholder input and discussion among 
the project team. Value-oriented comparative technique was used among the available 
data to estimate the likelihood of the risks occurring. 
 
Table 10: Risk Probability Metrics 
E. RISK REGISTER 
With all the active risks identified and the qualitative rating system established, 
the risks were tabulated and scored for probability of occurrence and consequence 
impact. A standard 5 by 5 Assessment Risk Matrix was used to multiply the qualitative 
risk scores, establish the overall score of each risk, and determine the overall probability 
of the risk coming to fruition. The active risks where plotted on the Risk Assessment 
Matrix as seen in Figure 13. 
A majority of the risk items identified over the course of the project were assessed 
as medium-level risks. The medium risk items include: 1) Operational Risk O2 
concerning duration of the design reference mission, which may exceed the at sea 
duration capability of the LCS; 2) Programmatic Risk P1 where the number of LCS ships 
produced can be reduced and or cancelled affecting mission supportability; and 3) 
Programmatic Risk P2 which identifies the potential of cost overruns due to the use of 
new technology implemented in the BMDS capable LCS mission package. The 
remainder of the medium risk items is shown in Figure 13. 
Description Level Metrics Rationale 
Frequent 5 Probability of occurrence ≥.8 in project or product life cycle 
Probable 4 Probability of occurrence ≥.6 in project or product life cycle 
Occasional 3 Probability of occurrence ≥.4 in project or product life cycle 
Remote 2 Probability of occurrence ≥.2 in project or product life cycle 




The high risk items identified were Operational Risks O1 and O3. Operational 
Risk O1 identifies the potential increase in crew size to a level not supported by the LCS 
platform in order for design reference mission success. Operational Risk O3 discusses the 
Level 1+ survivability rating of the LCS. The Level 1+ survivability rating is just above 
the lowest survivability rating for a Navy vessel. The low survivability could potentially 
impact mission success and the ability to counter threats faced the A2/AD environment.  
The identified low risk items were the use of high power radars for tracking on 
the LCS platform (T2), interoperability and integration of the LCS platform and BMD 
system (T3), and integration of the LCS platform with foreign BMD system (T6). 
Technical risks T2 and T3 were quantified as low risk items because of the established 
BMDS architecture for integration. There are many years of experience among the wide 
range of international, governmental and private industry on the integration of ballistic 

















Figure 13: Risk Assessment Diagram 
F. RISK HANDLING PLAN 
A risk handling plan was developed to evaluate the risks on what options were 
most viable based on the probability of occurrence and impact. The handling plan was 
used to mitigate the risks to acceptable levels of project tolerance. For each risk, the 
following handling options were selected:  
 Control: Create mitigation and/or contingency plans to handle the risk. 
 Assume:  Mitigation costs are unjustifiable and the impacts bearable to the project, so 
the risk is ignored. 
 Avoid: The risk is avoided by redesign or by adopting an alternative approach. 
 Transfer:  Transfer of risk from:  
o Subcontract to supplier. 




Although the majority of the identified risks were in the low to medium risk 
category, they all possess high impact scores as seen in Appendix D. System Design 
Risks. The realization of any of the risks could hinder the success of the project. In order 
to mitigate the potential impact of any of the risks, it was determined by the team that all 
the risks were going to be handled using the control option of the risk handling plan. The 
control option was used to create mitigation plans to handle each risk. 
G. RISK HANDLING PLAN 
The identified risks were actively mitigated to eliminate or reduce probability of 
occurrence and consequence. Simulation techniques were heavily relied upon to 
predictively assess the ability of each alternative option in meeting mission success when 
operationally stressed against DRM scenarios. In addition, the systems within these 
simulations were characterized with best available public domain information and 
requirements to enable assessment of BMD system of interest in the DRM operational 
environment as realistically as possible. Throughout the project, several different steps 
were used to find the most viable mitigation strategy. The evaluation steps were: 
 Dual track of alternate solutions and selection as knowledge improved. 
 Creative avoidance, redefinition of CONOPS and evolutionary 
acquisition. 
 Plan and re-plan until final mitigation strategy was developed. 
For each of the identified risks, a risk mitigation strategy was developed and 
monitored as the simulation results were gathered and information was collected and 
reviewed. The risk mitigation strategies for each of the risks along with the qualitative 
rating, and risk category can be seen in Appendix D. System Design Risks.  
The mitigation strategy developed for high risk item O1 is to perform a detailed 
source analysis and find areas where automation can be maximized while not violating 
mission effectiveness. An example of such a risk is leveraging existing crew resources as 




mitigation strategy developed is to assess and review survivability of the LCS against 
BMD threats and the potential combat environment of the DRM. This evaluation relied 
heavily on the simulation and will be discussed in the modeling and simulation section. 





X. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
An expected performance model is needed to effectively establish system 
requirements, measure currently fielded solution capabilities, and evaluate proposed 
system designs. The ExtendSim suite from Imagine That, Inc. was used for its powerful 
discrete event modeling capability. The modeling and simulation effort was divided into 
three areas: 
1. Evaluation of currently fielded solutions against DRM. 
2. Definition of System MOEs. 
3. Evaluation of proposed solution performance. 
This is an unclassified report. Limited empirical data describing sensor and 
ballistic missile interception performance is available via the public domain. Using only 
open source information available, assumptions were made based on the performance of 
the currently fielded solution. The alternate system options can then be compared to that 
of the base line fielded options by applicable parameters. For example, it was assumed 
that the Aegis System would have a certain performance when faced with the challenges 
of our Design Reference Mission (DRM). 
Open source information was used to bolster the accuracy of the allocated 
subsystem performance (i.e. Probability of Kill). To compare alternative system options 
against this reference baseline, key parameters that were available open source were 
heavily utilized. The model outputs, consequently, are only as accurate as the 
assumptions used and accuracy of the open source information provided therein. 
Therefore, it is a general understanding that the modeling outputs will not exactly 
represent real system performance. The process was only intended to allow for an 
educated comparison of currently fielded solutions against that of proposed alternative 
LCS based systems. The results could be easily be reevaluated if given access to 




To evaluate currently fielded solutions against our proposed DRM, threat analyses 
that had been performed for similar defense posture were utilized. A Report to Congress 
called Theater Missile Defense Architecture - Options for the Asia-Pacific Region 
provided the basis for a layered Ballistic Missile approach. (O'Rourke, Sea-Based 
Ballistic Missile Defense—Background and Issues for Congress, 2009) 
A. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The ballistic missile defense mission can be modeled as a series of discrete 
events. These iterations are a series of Bernoulli Trials. The trial flow can be seen in 
Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Simulation Process Flow 
 
Within the model, the mathematic position of the detection platform is established 
using Cartesian coordinates. The threat range to the detection platform is a key input 
requirement as ballistic missiles followed their flight path to the high value target 
protected by the BMD system. The following equation was used to solve for ballistic 
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 InitXRange is the initial x Cartesian range of the ballistic missile. 
 DetxOffset is the x offset of detection platform from the high value target. 
 Velx is the x vector velocity of the ballistic missile. 
 TimeCurremt is the current simulation time. 
 BMGenesis is the simulation time the Ballistic missile is launched. 
 InitYRange is the initial y Cartesian range of the ballistic missile. 
 DetyOffset is the y offset of detection platform from the high value target. 
 Vely is the y vector velocity of the ballistic missile. 
 
With the range of the ballistic missile relative to the BMD detection platform 
known, the maximum detection range was calculated. Little open source information is 
available for maximum radar detection range for the systems evaluated. John A. 
Robinson states that the AN/SPY-1D radar “can track golf ball-sized targets at ranges in 
excess of 165 kilometers” (Robinson, 2004). 
Given the radar cross section (RCS) of a golf ball (calculated as a simple metallic 
sphere), it was determined that this would correspond to a maximum detection range 
beyond the Launch Site range for a ballistic missile with the RCS of those included in the 
salvo of the DRM. A decision was made to limit the maximum detection range of the 
Aegis SPY-1 to the range from the detection platform to the launch sites. With this value 
established, a mathematical relationship was developed to parametrically compare other 
radar systems to the SPY-1 radar based on average radar power. The maximum detection 
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where: 
 RCS equals Radar Cross Section of missile being detected. 
 PTx equals average power transmitted for radar under evaluation. 
 PTAegis equals average power transmitted for Aegis AN/SPY-1. 
 
 
Figure 15: Range Detection (Rdet) 
The LCS platform has sea frame constraints that could prevent it from operating 




Systems approach. To provide this flexibility, the sensors providing the Detection 
capability needed to be able to be divorced from those providing tracking capability. This 
would allow detection and tracking to be both geographically and functionally 
independently located. The TrackEffect equation was used to solve for ballistic missile 
range from the tracking platform.   
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 InitXRange is the initial x Cartesian range of the ballistic missile. 
 TrackxOffset is the x offset of the tracking platform from the high value target. 
 Velx is the x vector velocity of the ballistic missile. 
 TimeCurrent is the current simulation time. 
 BMGenesis is the simulation time the Ballistic missile is launched. 
 InitYRange is the initial y Cartesian range of the ballistic missile. 
 TrackyOffset is the y offset of Track platform from the high value target. 
 Vely is the y vector velocity of the ballistic missile. 
 
With range of the ballistic missile relative to the BMD tracking platform known, 
the maximum tracking range is the next calculation required. The same assumptions and 
comparative formula were used to establish a baseline on the maximum tracking range as 
were used for maximum detection range. The radar track equation solves for maximum 
tracking range, which can be seen in Figure 16. 
 
            (
   






 RCS equals Radar Cross Section of missile being detected. 
 PTx equals average power transmitted for radar under evaluation. 
 PTAegis equals average power transmitted for Aegis AN/SPY-1. 
 
 





Radar returns that interfere with the target signal returns are termed clutter. The 
geographic and population phenomenon of the world make radar clutter more 
predominate in the littorals. The following are some of the reasons for higher clutter 
responses in or near littoral waterways (Sekine, Matsuo, & Mao, 1990): 
 Waters interaction with coastlines in the form of waves 
 Irregular land masses of coastlines 
 Bird/Insect migration and massing 
 Meteorological phenomenon 
 Settlements 
 Air Traffic 
The design reference mission was selected based on an area that had 
representative clutter for the littoral BMD mission. The sea state, wind speed, 
precipitation, and cloud cover for the DRM region was estimated using data for the Gulf 
of Sidra (National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association, 2013). The sea state was 
estimated on the Douglas Scale to be averaging a sea state 3 (Met Lab UK, 2013). 
 
Table 11: DRM Meteorological Clutter Parameters 
 
The historic meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) data listed in Table 11 
does not have any high radar clutter drivers. The geography of the region primarily 
consists of desert terrain, which has little radar reflective response. No attempt was made 
to research bird or insect migration or massing for the region. The region has a high 
Meteorological Clutter Parameter Average For 5/01/12 thru 5/01/13 
Wave height .79 Meters 
Cloud cover 25% or Mostly clear 
Wind speed 11 MPH 




incidence of civilian air traffic with the area surrounding the Gulf of Sidra having 144 
airports, 64 of those being paved (CIA World Fact Book, 2012). The large number of 
airports indicates that discerning ballistic missile targets from civilian and military air 
traffic will be difficult.   
Sekine and Yuhai suggest using a Weibull distribution to model radar clutter. The 
ExtendSim suite allows a random number set to be generated based on a Weibull 
distribution. The factors affecting radar clutter were used to parametrically choose a 
masking point on the stochastic Weibull distribution.   
To model clutter a Signal to Clutter (S/C) ratio needed to be established. Open 
source information on true radar power, transmit gain, and receive gain is not available 
for most radar systems. The DRM was intended to be a radar stressing environment. 
Given this stressful environment the S/C was set such that the Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar 
would fail to detect 7% of incoming ballistic missiles due to clutter. This assumption 
allowed for a parametric comparison of other radars simulated based on their respective 
power and band. 
Radar power and band provided variables for the masking point that were 
adjusted to enable modeling of the system. The Aegis AN/SPY-1B variant has a 58 kW 
average power is operating in the S-band as modeled by the following relationship 




        
    
 
where: 
 Pt is the power transmitted. 
 CR is clutter reduction techniques. 
 Lbs is radar beam shape loss. 
 σ0 is clutter reflectivity. 




No access to information on clutter reduction algorithms or radar beam shape is 
available for this study. In addition to this consideration, an assumption was made that 
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where: 
 λp is the proportion the wavelength of radar emission. 
 
Sekine and Yuhai state that when compared to the 9.1 cm S-Band wavelength, 
this proportion can be found using the below relationship and values for common bands 
are shown in Figure 18: Proportional wavelength reflectivity offset. The relative 
masking point for the standard Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar is modeled by Figure 17. 




          
 









Figure 18: Proportional wavelength reflectivity offset 
C. CURRENTLY FIELDED SOLUTION EVALUATION 
Despite restricted access to information on the true subsystem and component 
performance, the model established a means of evaluating proposed system projected 
performance. The LCS ballistic missile defense platform is required to have performance 
greater than or equal to that of the ready to deploy solutions available. 
The centerpiece of the U.S. ballistic missile defense arsenal is the Aegis warship 
armed with the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). This system has been actively been 
conducting anti-ballistic missile patrols as part of the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach (EPAA) since its initial operating capability (IOC) in April 2011 (National 
Defense Industrial Association, 2011). 
The Aegis platform is multi-role, and the growth of the BMD mission is 




Missile Defense—Background and Issues for Congress, 2009). Theater based ballistic 
missiles (TBBMs) account for greater than 90% percentage of the world’s overall BM 
population. The Aegis system uses the SM-3 as its primary interceptor capability; 
however, the SM-3 does not have a proven capability of intercepting endo-atmospheric 
traveling missiles. (O'Rourke, 2013) 
An LCS based solution needs to address the TBBM problem and perform BMD in 
the littorals against a BM threat composed of both endo- and exo-atmospheric missiles at 
least as well as the Aegis platform. As a comparison, modeling and simulation would be 
used to estimate the performance of the Aegis platform when challenged with the same 
DRM parameters. 
O’Rourke suggests that two Aegis BMD capable ships would make up the 
CONOPS for the Littoral TBBM defense posture (i.e. Korea). Because of the limitations 
of the SM-3 against endo-atmospheric targets, O’Rourke recommends that the Aegis be 
supplemented by either a THAAD system or PAC3 variant. With the current political 
climate and the general paradigm against committing to a “boots on the ground” solution, 
a superior response is one that does not require troops of any number to be stationed on a 
threatened country or region. 
The advanced Aegis combat system allows for nearly all resources to be shared; 
detection, tracking, target illumination, and Launch-on-Remote (LOR) or Engage-on-
Remote (EOR) capabilities. This system of systems approach was included in the 
assumptions used for the simulation. The target illumination and engagement 
assignments were modeled as a resource pool. A primary platform for these functions 
was selected based on geographic location relative to the threat, if the resource was busy 
than an alternative platform was used.  
The Aegis/SM-3 BMD capability is frequently tested. MDA advertises that the 
SM-3 has had 19 successful interceptions in 22 attempts. It has been assumed that the test 





1. Aegis Results 
The two Aegis platforms were simulated against the DRM mission for thirty runs. 
The summary output of the simulation was the number of times that the high value asset 
trying to be protected is hit. This output is provided in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Simulation results for 2 Aegis against DRM 
 
It should be noted that the DRM salvo consisted of 24 total missiles of which 10 
had an endo-atmospheric flight path. Without the capability to make endo-atmospheric 
intercepts the SM-3 will allow all the successful, no early-flight failure or mid-flight 
failure, to hit the high value target. 
The simulation output was converted to probability of raid annihilation 
(Pra) (Green & Johnson, 2002). Pra was adopted as one of the MOE for the LCS-based 
solution. 




                            
where: 
Pdet=Probability of Detection. 
PControl=Probability of Control. 
PEngage=Probability of Successful Engagement. 
 
The resulting Pra for the two BMD capable Aegis platforms was 0.55. This formed 
the basis for the system MOE; in that the LCS shall have a Pra greater than or equal to 
0.55. 
2. PAC3 
To validate the results found with the Aegis results a land-based, shorter range 
solution was simulated. The Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC3) was chosen as its 
capabilities had a fair amount of open source information available. Based on the 
advertised capabilities to intercept either an endo-atmospheric or exo-atmospheric 
traveling ballistic missile, the PAC3 is anticipated to have a superior Pra. The simulation 
validated this hypothesis adding additional confidence in the model.   
Two PAC3 batteries were modeled and they were geographically situated to 
maximize effectiveness. They were modeled as independent batteries with only detection 
data shared. Target illuminators utilization posed a problem as one battery could have a 
queue while the other was not being utilized.   
3. PAC3 Results 
The two PAC3 platforms were simulated against the DRM mission for thirty runs. 




value asset is hit. This output can be seen it Figure 20. The resulting Pra for the two PAC3 
batteries was calculated at 0.64. 
 
Figure 20: Simulation results for two PAC3 batteries against DRM 
 
4. Layered Defense 
In a report to Congress, the DoD suggests use of a layered approach to defend the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan from aggressor state ballistic missile attacks 
(Dept. of Defense, 1999). The universal elements recommended between all the defense 
spaces is the use of a sea based leg for upper tier defense and a land based component for 
the lower tier.   
This multi layered approach is assumed to provide an effective counter for the 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD). To provide final accreditation to the model this layered 
approach was simulated. The Aegis ships are hypothesized to intercept the majority of the 
exo-atmospheric missiles and the PAC3 to intercept the endo-atmospheric missile. The 
PAC3 would then proceed to intercept the remaining Aegis leaked exo-atmospheric 
missiles. The platforms were modeled as a system of systems with cooperative 




engagement capability such that the PAC3 batteries benefited from the superior range of 
the Aegis SPY-1 radar for detection. As this system resembles those currently being 
employed as part of the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) in 
the European region, the Pra is assumed to indicate an effective scenario (Hendrickson, 
2012).   
5.  Layered Defense Results  
The layered defense was simulated against the DRM mission for thirty 
runs. The output of the summary output of the simulation was the number of times that 
the high value asset trying to be protected is hit. This output is shown in Figure 21. The 
resulting Pra for the layered Ballistic defense posture was calculated as 0.94. 
 
Figure 21: Layered Defense vs. DRM 
 




6. Currently Fielded Solution Evaluation Conclusion 
The Department of Defense defines modeling and simulation validation as “the 
process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation and its associated data 
are an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses 
of the model” (DODINST 5000.61). To represent expected real-world conditions, the 
simulation of currently fielded solutions was modeled and compared against performance 
assumptions. As previously noted, this is acknowledged not to be the most accurate 
means of validation; however, this study is constrained to only unclassified open source 
information.   
Given the logical output of the simulation when the currently fielded solutions are 
challenged by the DRM, the model is considered to be representative to move forward 
with system design.  Table 12 shows the comparison between expected and modeled. 
 
Table 12: Validation Comparison 
7. Design of Experiments 
To establish a requirement band for key subsystems of the LCS BMD mission 
package, a design of experiments (DOE) was used. A series of informal sensitivity 
simulations were conducted to determine the factors that would be used for the DOE 
efforts. It was determined that the following would be used for the DOE: 
 Range to detect ballistic missiles. 
 Capability for both endo and exo-atmospheric intercepts. 
System Simulated Expected Pra Simulated Pra 
Two Aegis BMD Capable 
Platforms 
Not great due to inability to 
engage endo-atmospheric missiles 
0.55 
Two PAC3 Batteries Better than Aegis solution 
because of Endo/Exo-atmospheric 
capability 
0.64 




 Range to engage. 
 Probability of kill. 
These four factors were assigned to either a high or low level grouping. These 
values were assigned based on research of BMD system and anti-air system 
subsystem/component performance. The associated levels for the four factors are shown 
in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: DOE Factor Levels 
 
A full factorial experiment was considered feasible as there were only 16 discreet 
permutations. These 16 permutations would establish the corners for the design space and 
are seen in Table 14. The 16 points were run on the model 30 times each. The output Pra 
was averaged for the 30 runs to establish a simulated average Pra for the 16 DOE points. 
 
 
Factor Low Level High Level Variable Designation 
Range to Detect 30 km 800 km X1 
Endo/Exo-atmospheric No Yes X2 
Range to Engage 5 km 500 km X3 




Table 14: DOE Corner Values 
 
A multi variant regression analysis was performed on the averaged data output. 
The regression analysis established a prediction formula. 
 
        
    (  )       (  )        
  
(  )       (  )        
 
where: 
X1= Range to Detect 
X2= Endo/Exo-atmospheric Capability 
X3= Range to Engage 
X4= PK 
 
The regression equation was used to predict the Pra for the same 16 points used for 
the DOE. The results of this prediction can be seen in the normalized star plots of Figure 
22, which exhibit a high degree of consistency between the simulated and predicted 
Point Range Detect Endo/Exo Range Engage PK 
1 - - - - 
2 + - - - 
3 - + - - 
4 - - + - 
5 - - - + 
6 + + - - 
7 + - + - 
8 + - - + 
9 - + + - 
10 - + - + 
11 - - + + 
12 + + + + 
13 - + + + 
14 + - + + 
15 + + - + 




regression models. This is further reinforced by the regression analysis statistics R-
Squared value of 0.89, indicating that 0.89 of the dependent variable, Pra, can be 
explained by the independent variables. The DOE regression results are presented in 
Table 15. 
 









 Intercept R-Det Endo/Exo R-Engage PoK Intercept 
Coefficients 0.0229 0.0000 0.4647 0.0005 0.1438 0.0229 
Standard Error 0.0685 0.0001 0.0563 0.0001 0.0823 0.0685 
t-Statistic 0.3336 0.0896 8.2614 4.0763 1.7472 0.3336 
p-Value 0.7450 0.9302 0.0000 0.0018 0.1084 0.7450 
Lower 5% -0.1279 -0.0002 0.3409 0.0002 -0.0374 -0.1279 
Upper 95% 0.1736 0.0002 0.5885 0.0007 0.3250 0.1736 
Table 15: DOE Regression Results 
The p-Value for only Endo/Exo atmospheric capability and the Maximum Range 
to Engage indicate statistical significance at 90% confidence or 0.10 alpha levels. This is 





Figure 23: Tornado Analysis Output 
The Tornado Analysis reinforces that the DOE regression is most sensitive to 
perturbations of the Endo/Exo atmospheric capability followed by the Range to Engage 
variable. Furthermore, the regression statistics and star plots substantiate that the 




Appendix G. BMD Engagement Sequence for a detailed timeline of the BMD 





XI. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
The analysis of [system] alternatives (AoA) was performed on two levels. First, 
research was conducted to identify candidate system components capable of meeting the 
requirements of the notional functional architecture. Second, models of these components 
were developed, grouped in representations of candidate physical architecture variants, 
and integrated into a larger BMD simulation, which enabled assessment of candidate 
BMD system performance against simulated missile attack conditions prescribed in the 
design reference mission. The subsequent “system of systems” analysis of variants, 
served as the basis for selection of the physical system architecture for the proposed 
BMD mission package. 
The four main components of the functional architecture served as the primary 
focus of the component analysis of alternatives; detection, control, engagement (launch), 
and engagement (interception). For each case, a series of measures of effectiveness were 
translated into key performance parameters based on the overall system requirements. For 
each, thresholds were established to define how the analysis would be conducted (Figure 
24). 
 




Swing weights were developed to provide additional analysis criterion for each 
subsystem (Figure 25). The swing weight evaluation was conducted using the standard 
variance versus importance matrix where all criteria were assigned a value from 0–10. 
These values were then normalized to determine each criterion’s overall weighted 
importance for use in the alternatives analysis. 
 





In order to determine the component pool, a morphological box (Appendix F. 
Morphological Box) was created to group all plausible system permutations. The system 
pool consisted of existing domestic systems, foreign systems, development projects, and 
the plausibility of creating a new system for this specific need. 
A. COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
1. Detect 
The detection analysis of alternatives focused on those systems that were 
considered to meet some or most of the mission requirements per the morphological box. 
Detection elements were analyzed primarily based on range, sensitivity, and physical size 
(per the swing weight analysis). In this case, cost was not considered a primary concern. 
The derived values are normalized by regression analysis to convert all values to a linear 
scale. 
Overall, the THAAD, AMDR, and SPY-1F systems proved most suitable to the 
system architecture; however, nearly all alternatives were capable of meeting mission 







Figure 26: Detection Alternatives Analysis 
 
 





The control elements were very heavily scrutinized on cost and existing BMD 
capability (Figure 28). Given the latter, it comes as no surprise that the BMD-capable 
platforms significantly outperformed. Aegis was the top contender and was, therefore, 
ultimately one of the control elements selected for use later in the downselect process. 
 
Figure 28: Control Alternatives Analysis 
3. Engage (Launch) 
Physical size was the primary concern of the launcher component of the 
engagement element. Being a much smaller displacement sea frame compared to its 
larger destroyer and frigate cousins, space is a significant constraint on the LCS sea 
frame. The launcher AoA shows that THAAD scored highest across all systems with 





Figure 29: Launch Engagement Alternatives Analysis 
4. Engage (Intercept) 
The interceptor analysis of alternatives represents the most critical element of the 
BMD architecture. Availability was the primary concern; however, nearly all systems 
analyzed exhibited an operational availability exceeding the system requirement (and 
those that did not were eliminated from the selection pool). As a result, this statistic was 
omitted from the analysis and cost, range, and probability of kill became the highest 
weighted factors (respectively).  Figure 31 highlights the results of the analysis showing 
that the THAAD and ESSM systems prove the best fits for the system needs. Details 





Figure 30: Details on the THAAD Interceptor (From Defense Industry Daily, 2013) 
 




B. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
1. Variant A: Maximizing Integration  
In order to minimize acquisition cost and preserve the original LCS mission 
package concept, a variant utilizing only those components that easily integrate within 
the open architecture of the LCS sea frame was considered. The LCS, in its open 
architecture design, has multiple designated areas for swappable weapons modules. 
Based on the class of LCS, this includes several rear stations for smaller foot-printed 
weapons systems and a single larger forward footprint, current CONOPS for LCS has this 
station occupied by the forward gun weapons system. 
Variant A takes advantage of existing detection systems utilizing the TRS-3D 
radar (Freedom Class) or the Sea GIRAFFE radar (Independence Class). These radars, 
while broadcasting in low-resolution C-band, have proven capability for detecting near-
range ballistic missile threats. A separate, high frequency targeting radar will be 
necessary for engagement. 
The fire control system will utilize the existing COMBATSS-21 system. This 
system already shares 80% of its code with the Aegis weapons system. Significant 
software modification would be necessary to provide BMD capability to the Variant A 
design. 
The launcher, based on the AOA, would be a slightly modified design based on 
the THAAD launcher. Given the low footprint, this could integrate into the forward space 
occupied by the gun weapons system or one of the mid-ship spaces, currently 
unoccupied.   
Variant A Summary: 
Detection: TRS-3D or Sea GIRAFFE (modified) 
Control: COMBATSS-21 (modified) 





2. Variant B: Maximizing Component Performance 
Variant B stresses the use of integrating existing weapons systems. However, 
rather than minimizing requisite modification to the sea frame, the emphasis was placed 
on reducing the modification of the BMD system elements. 
Variant B uses a smaller, BMD-specific radar system mounted in an auxiliary 
location in a weapons station module. A smaller radar such as SPY-1F has the capability 
to provide three dimensional, 360 degree, total field of view coverage.   
The fire control system will require moderate modification, but will be heavily 
based on the Aegis weapons system. 
A vertical launching system that can fit into the larger, forward weapons station 
will provide increased defense against ballistic missile threats. Likewise, a vertically 
launched missile, such as the ESSM will provide proven engagement capability from a 
sea-based platform. 
Variant B Summary: 
Engagement: SPY-1F 
Control: Aegis BMD 4.0.x 
Launcher: Mk41 VLS 
Engagement: ESSM 
 
3. Variant C: Maximizing BMD Capability  
Variant C will completely forego the LCS open architecture and provide a BMD-
specific solution based on the existing sea frame. As a result, two emergent paths are 
possible; new systems can be developed to accommodate the existing LCS footprint or 
the LCS can be physically altered to accommodate existing systems. Either way, both 




Variant B. However, BMD capability would be increased significantly to match that of 
the Aegis BMD system. A contractor illustration of a proposed BMD ship based off of 
the LCS sea frame can be seen in Figure 32. 
Variant C Summary: 
Engagement: New System Design 
Control: New System Design 
Launcher: New System Design 
Engagement: New System Design 
 




C. DOWNSELECT METHODOLOGY 
The downselect strategy for the variant options is based on the initial 
requirements and the overall cost versus performance, while existing within the 
guidelines set forth for system integration, DRM and the stakeholder needs. Trade studies 
were performed to downselect between the variants and choose the optimum variant for 
the design reference mission. The downselect evaluation criterion was to meet the key 
mission performance parameters and display an equivalent or better performing system 
than the fielded Aegis system. 
The three variants, based on the AOA and the simulation results, focused on 
lowest cost/maximum integration, maximum effectiveness, or maximum BMDS 
capability. The three variants ascend from the least to most costly solution. Variant A 
preserves the mission package concept by choosing BMD-capable systems that will 
physically fit to the LCS sea frame but require some modification for integration. Variant 
B focuses on the integration of existing BMD-capable systems without modification. 
Variant C focuses on the implementation of a custom design to meet the established 
requirements. 
The trade-offs chosen in order to downselect between the three where cost, 
complexity, capability and the ability to meet the rapid deployment schedule. In the next 
section cost comparisons between the different variants are made to view the most cost 










XII. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. COST MODELING 
In the current defense environment, cost plays a crucial role in any acquisition 
decision. On par with performance, total ownership cost (TOC) is a crucial figure that is 
closely scrutinized by key decision makers. Fortunately, there are many well-developed 
tools to help forecast TOC. These tools leverage the latest statistical algorithms and also 
take advantage of empirical program cost and schedule performance data of past 
programs. 
TOC is a cost figure that aggregates the entire estimated cost of designing, 
procuring, operating, and eventually, disposing the weapons system. However, TOC also 
reflects the costs associated with personnel, ordnance, and other indirect costs. A subset 
of TOC that does not account for these costs is called system Life-Cycle Cost (LCC). 
LCC is the most commonly used figure when discussing expected programmatic budgets.  
Figure 33 shows the official DoD-sanctioned LCC breakdown as presented by the 





Figure 33: Defense Program Life-Cycle Cost (From DAU, 2012) 
Life-Cycle Cost can be further broken down based on the phase of system 
development of the acquisition program (Figure 34). This is important because not all 
three proposed variants are in the same phase of system development. Variant A is in a 
late phase of system evolution as many of its comprising components technologically 
mature. Variant C is the least technologically mature; therefore, it is in the earliest stages 
of evolutionary development. These factors are considered in the final, rolled-up LCC 
estimates. 
For all three variants, the COCOMO II software analysis tool and Advance 
Mission Cost Model (AMCM) served as primary reference datasets for the hardware and 
software development/modification calculations. Note that all values are in FY12 dollars 





Figure 34: Breakdown of Life-Cycle Cost Elements (From DAU, 2012)  
1. Variant A Life-Cycle Cost: 
Summary: 
Detect: $8.61M for TRS-3D radar 
Control: $140M for fire control system 
Engage (L): $17.3M for THAAD modified launcher 
Engage (I): $38M for 100 THAAD missiles 





Variant A uses the radar system integral to the current LCS sea frame, yet BMD 
capability upgrades are estimated to cost an additional $8.61M per hull. The fire control 
system is a modified version of the Aegis-based COMBATSS-21. However, the software 
elements of COMBATSS-21 are comprised of 2.5M source lines of code (SLOC) 
whereas Aegis BMD has 3.5M SLOC. In order to upgrade to BMD capability, an 
estimated 1M additional SLOC will be written and approximately 0.5M SLOC will reqire 
modification. Predictive analysis, using the COCOMO II software, indicates that this 
upgrade is anticipated to cost $140M. 
The engagement elements of the BMDS are both derived from the currently 
fielded THAAD weapons system. Moderate modifications are required to equip the 
componets for shipboard use in addition to the cost of the core weapons system. Based on 
AMCM cost modeling, this equates to $17.3M for the launcher mechanism and $38M for 
a salvo of 100 interceptors. 
Finally, as minimal modification to the sea frame is allowed, the cost associated 
with developing and bringing forth the Variant A solution is estimated at $245M. This 
figure is derived from the 2010 proposal submitted by Lockheed-Martin and Marrinette 
Marine, adjusted for FY12 cost of money. 
2. Variant B Life-Cycle Cost: 
Summary: 
Detect: $12.2M for SPY-1F radar 
Control: $66.1M for fire control system 
Engage (L): $9.61M for Mk41 VLS 
Engage (I): $77.6M for 100 ESSM 
Sea Frame: $292M for slightly modified base LCS sea frame 
Variant B upgrades the radar system to the Aegis-based SPY-1F array. As this is 




increased intgration cost). The core Aegis 4.0.X derived fire control system was chosen 
for Variant B. However, in order to integrate with the LCS architecture, an estimated 
0.5M SLOC will need to be written and an additional 1M modified for an estimated cost 
of $66.1M. 
The launcher selected for use is the Mk41 vertical launching system (VLS). Slight 
modification will be necessary to integrate with the weapons system architecture. This 
brings the estimated cost to $9.61 per launcher. However, significant modification to the 
LCS sea frame will be necessary to accommodate the Mk41’s footprint. These costs are 
captured in the increased sea frame cost per the AMCM modeling. Finally, cost modeling 
for the selection of the evolved sea sparrow missile interceptor equates to $77.6M for a 
salvo of 100 interceptors. 
3. Variant C Life-Cycle Cost: 
Summary: 
Detect: $19.1M for new radar 
Control: $301M for fire control system 
Engage (L): $23.5M for new launcher 
Engage (I): $586M for new missile 
Sea Frame: $346M for new design sea frame based on LCS design 
Variant C is composed entirely of new or heavily modified components, in 
addition to the construction of a novel sea frame based on the LCS architecture. This 
concept is closely correlated with the U.S. Navy’s foreign military sales (FMS) 
development effort for the Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP II). 
Using SNEP II estimates and AMCM derivations, the cost for a new detection 
radar is $19.1M. The heavily modified fire control software will require an estimated 2M 
new SLOC, with 0.5M additional SLOC modified for a projected cost of $301M. The 




design and development of new systems (assuming very high complexity and a 2025 
initial operating capability). 
Finally, the sea frame modifications will increase by approximately 40% to an 
estimated figure of $346M per sea frame (assuming a 20 ship procurement profile).  
Table 16 captures the rolled up component costs for each system element for all three 
variants. 
 
Margin of Error: ±3% 
Table 16: Component LCC vs. System Variant (in $Millions USD) 
 
Table 17: LCC Percentage based on System Definition 
  
 Detect Control Launch Intercept Sea Frame 
Variant A $8.61 $140 $17.3 $38 $245 
Variant B $12.2 $66.1 $9.61 $77.6 $292 
Variant C $19.1 $301 $23.5 $586 $346 
 RDT&E Procurement Operations Disposal Total 
Detect 22% 49% 33% 2% 100% 
Control 75% 15% 10% 0% 100% 
Launch 22% 49% 33% 2% 100% 
Intercept 27% 33% 39% 0% 100% 




Margin of Error: ±3% 
Table 18: Aggregate LCC per System Variant (in $Billions USD) 
 
Table 17 discusses the total LCC percentages based on system component 
according to the DoD-revised 21st century procurement estimates (DODINST 5000.1, 
1999). These figures, along with the component Life-Cycle Cost tabulations allow for an 
aggregate summation of LCC for each variant (Table 18). From this data, Variant A and 
Variant B are readily recognized to have equivalent LCCs (compensating for margin of 
error). Further downselect between these three variants will be conducted in the 
following verification and validation sections. 
B. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
The three compiled variants were simulated against the DRM to determine a 
predicted Pra. From the Analysis of Alternatives, System of Systems downselect, Variant 
A was composed of either the EADS TRS-3D or Sea GIRAFFE (modified) for the sensor 
suite. As the two the radar packages had a similar detection range (EADS TRS-3D 200 
km and modified Sea GIRAFFE 180 km) they were not modeled as discrete variants. 
To enable comparative assessments of the variants operating in likely deployment 
modes offering best-possible mission effectiveness, the relative Pra was based on the 
resources provided by two LCS BMD capable platforms. Target illumination for variant 
A1, A2, and B was modeled as being provided by CEAMOUNT Solid State Continuous 
Wave Illuminator. With four discrete emitting faces mounted at 90o intervals as shown in 
Figure 35. Two of the illuminator faces would be in the beam shadow of the incoming 
salvo of ballistic missiles. 
 RDT&E Procurement Operations Disposal Total 
Variant A $2.98 $8.96 $14.9 $2.98 $29.8 
Variant B $3.06 $9.18 $15.3 $3.06 $30.6 




Based on this configuration, it is assumed that at least two ballistic missile targets 
can be illuminated per panel, making for a total of four per ship. The combat system for 
all variants modeled is assumed to allow for a system of systems approach to target 
allocation based on probability of success and availability. Target illumination resource 
sharing to allow Launch-on-Remote (LoR) is included in Variant C modeling.   
 
Figure 35: Radar Cupula Configuration (From CEA, 2011)  
Thirty (30) simulation runs were conducted for each variant and an average Pra 





Figure 36: Variant Simulation Results Comparison 
No limitation was provided to the number of interceptors available to the LCS 
BMD platforms for variant comparisons. The simulation results for each run provided a 
total number of interceptor launches these totals were averaged and can be seen in Figure 
37. The interceptor consumption averages will be used to determine feasibility of LCS 





Figure 37: Average Interceptor Launches per variant 
C. INTEGRATION  
A high level component integration assessment was performed to further evaluate 
feasibility. The power and space available for the monohull and trimaran versions are 
given in the High Level Requirements section of this report, but to summarize, the LCS 
monohull variant has two weapons module stations, and the trimaran has three, each with 
about 50 cubic meters of useable volume. Each of the internal support module stations 
has about 36 cubic meters of volume. The power available varies station to station, but no 
more than 50 kW is available at any single station. 
1. Solution Variant A Integration  
The first solution variant meets the project requirement for a true “mission 
package.”  No major modifications to the sea frame are required. The system uses the 
TRS-3D or Sea GIRAFFE radar and the COMBATSS-21 combat management system 




interface with the BMDS launcher system, very little additional power would be required 
for combat management and fire control. 
If the launcher cannot be integrated with the existing combat system, then a 
mission module suite similar to the U.S. Army Battle Management/Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence (BMC3I) package is recommended for integration. 
The BMC3I already resembles a mission package in that it is packaged as several 
portable conex-like vans. The suite includes a tactical operations station and a launch 
control station that together require 15 kW of power, and it also includes an operator 
control unit that requires another 15 kW. Each of the three BMC3I package components 
fit onto the back of a HMMWV. The same three components could be modified for 
shipboard use and easily fit into three of the LCS internal mission module stations 
(Department of the Army, 2000). 
 
Figure 38: LCS-1 System Integration (After SeaForces, 2012) 
The launcher system of Variant A will likely require significant modifications in 




truck-mounted system. Containers 7.0 meters long x 0.5 meters wide x 0.5 meters high 
are typically assembled in groups of eight. The containers are used to store, transport, and 
launch THAAD missiles. An assembly of eight containers requires 10 kW of power.   
 
Figure 39:  LCS-2 System Integration (After SeaForces, 2012) 
The 50 cubic meter space envelope available at each weapon station is not well-
suited for integrating a long, missile cell type weapon that sits flush with the ship’s 
topside surfaces. Additional analyses are needed to determine exactly how the canisters 
would be installed, but for this concept design, it was estimated that eight cells could be 




eight cell weapons module was applied to the concept resulting in a total launcher power 
requirement of 20 kW. 
Two support modules, each requiring 10 kw, were added to the package for 
missile and launcher equipment and maintenance bringing the total additional power 
required to support the BMD mission package to 70 kw, including the THAAD control 
and operations stations. 
2. Variant B Integration  
The second variant requires installation of a higher powered radar which is better 
suited for ballistic missile detection and tracking. This would be a significant effort; the 
ship would need to be taken out of service for an extended period to perform this 
technology upgrade. While this approach is not aligned with the “mission package” 
concept, the effort would yield a ship that would be much more effective in performing 
the BMD mission. 
The SPY-1F radar would require a least an additional 25 kw of power over the 
currently installed TRS or Sea GIRAFFE radars (Jane's, 2012). Although this power 
would not be supplied from the mission modules, the added power demand will likely 
require more installed power on the LCS or the addition of power generator modules. The 
SPY-1F would also require a large amount of additional volume and structure to support 
the array faces. Futher analyses are required to determine if the LCS has adequate design 
margin and stabiltiy to support such a modification. 
For combat management, the Aegis BMD 4.0 CMS would also likely require 
additional power over the currently installed COMBATSS system. However, it would not 
be supplied from the module stations. 
For engagement, four Mk41 VLS cells would be installed at each weapon module 
station in a manner similarly envisioned for the THAAD launcher system. Again, 
modifications to the cells and the weapons stations would be required to fit the launcher 




missiles in each cell. The total power needed for the launcher system is not known, but 50 




XIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
The objective of this concept design study was to assess the feasibility of a BMD 
mission package for the LCS. A systems engineering approach was used to perform the 
conceptual design of a BMD capable LCS. Through requirements analysis, cost and 
performance thresholds were determined and the LCS sea frame integration metrics were 
identified. 
Only publicly sourced information was used in the analysis. This necessitated use 
of a comparative approach for measuring system performance against an assumed 
success measure—that the Aegis platform meets the U.S. Navy requirement for BMD 
and, therefore, the proposed LCS BMD solution would need perform at least as 
effectively in the specified DRM. A high-level assessment of possible threats guided the 
development of a DRM where the threat country launches a combination of scud and 
ballistic missiles from three different locations, all within 800 km of the asset. The Aegis 
BMD system was simulated in the DRM and the probability of raid annihilation was used 
to quantify the system’s performance. 
To determine LCS solution characteristics, a design of experiments was 
conducted using a range of available radars, combat management systems, and 
engagement systems. The result produced several “packages” that met the requirement to 
perform as effectively as the Aegis system in the DRM. An analysis of alternatives, that 
included system costs, was performed that further reduced the possibilities to one 
“mission package” of BMD system components that meet the performance threshold and 
LCS sea frame limitations. Additionally, two other solution variants were produced that 
would be more effective in the DRM but would not integrate as a mission packages. Both 




The analysis ultimately showed that two Littoral Combat Ships positioned near an 
asset, each equipped with 16 THAAD launchers and missiles, using the currently 
installed TRS-3D or Sea GIRAFFE radars, could intercept an incoming salvo of short 
range ballistic missiles and scud missiles more effectively than one Aegis equipped 
destroyer. Furthermore, the cost of two BMD-equipped LCSs is half as much as an Aegis 
equipped destroyer. Technical and programmatic risks were identified and several large 
assumptions were made over the course of system concept development, but the analysis 
showed that the LCS can play a role in BMD. 
Proposed variant performance has been estimated using the developed BMD 
simulation. Pra was used as the primary MOP and System Cost was used as the primary 
MoS for comparing the variants. These primary MOEs are plotted on Figure 40. 
Estimated system Life-Cycle Cost is on the horizontal axis, in billions of USD, and Pra is 
plotted on the vertical axis.  
 




Variant A and Variant C establish the efficient frontier for the decision space. 
Variant B is dominated by Variant A as Variant A has superior Pra and costs less than 
Variant B. 
At project inception the LCS BMD capability was intended to be a Mission 
Package, integrating with the open architecture of the LCS program. This open 
architecture integration requirement was made a MoS. Using the open architecture 
integration MoS as the secondary criteria for analysis, Variant A is the clear selection. 
Not only does it provide the lowest cost solution, it is hypothesized to have significantly 
higher Pra (via modeling) than the KPP of 0.55 derived from the Aegis solution. 
To test this hypothesis a one sided hypothesis test was executed; 
: ( ) ( )
: ( ) ( )
o ra ra
A ra ra
H P VariantA P Aegis





: ( ) 0.55













































The calculated p-value was verified using the Microsoft Excel t-test function to be 
5.74x10–22 for the subject datasets. This small p-value indicates that the null hypothesis 
is false and that there is statistical evidence to accept the alternate hypothesis that the P ra 
for the Variant A is superior to that of the Aegis solution. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Moving forward, further efforts to develop a BMD mission package should look 
at weapons system integration in more detail and consider a system of systems approach 
where the system interfaces with existing and future BMD assets, such as ground based 
systems and space based sensors. In addition, non-publically available classified 
component characteristics and performance data should be incorporated into the 
simulation to more accurately reflect actual system performance capabilities. 
The open architecture design of the LCS will eventually present the U.S. Navy 
with the ability to meet nearly every threat and perform any mission by integrating suites 
of tailored off-the-shelf components. Today, in this nascent stage of evolutionary 
development, LCS programs face expected and unexpected technical and political 
challenges that, once overcome, will ultimately make the programs stronger and more 
effective. As the LCS proves itself in its ability to perform the ASW, ASuW, and MCM 
missions, Navy program offices will be looking for the next packages to align to address 
future capability gaps. 
In an assessment of future capability-need, countless sources cite gaps in BMD. 
Arms control groups in the U.S. and abroad recognize that ballistic missiles are no longer 
solely controlled by a few countries, and that no one really has a clear picture of who has 
what. Regional incidents, such as the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67), 
serve as an ever-present reminder that the smallest force has the means to conduct Anti-
Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) operations that can effectively halt U.S. naval efforts by 





As noted, this project revealed the viability of an LCS mission package for 
fulfilling emerging regional BMD mission needs. The LCS, however, is not envisioned to 
perform midcourse detection and engagement of medium and long range ballistic 
missiles from a sea based platform, as the installed power and volume exceeds the 
capabilities of the LCS. This mission role is expected to remain exclusively with Aegis-
equipped platforms for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the overall demand is 
expected to increase as the inventory of BMD-capable ships is limited and will likely 
stretched thinner over the next decade. 
As the LCS inventory grows, cost-effective short and medium range BMD 
coverage over a wider expanse of littoral assets does appear feasible through the 





















APPENDIX B. UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 
Measurement        Unit 
Meters         m 
Kilometers        km 
Inches         in 
Feet          ft 
Pounds         lbs 
Kilograms        kg 
Knot (nautical miles per hour)     kt 
Kilowatts        kW 
Megawatts        MW 
Hertz (frequency)       Hz 
Probability of X       PXX 






























APPENDIX E. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
REQ 0 MISSION PACKAGE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
REQ.1 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
REQ.1.1 INPUT REQUIREMENTS 
  REQ.1.1.1 The system shall accept command and control from the operator 
 REQ.1.1.2 The system shall monitor environmental information from its 
operational environment 
  REQ.1.1.3 The system shall accept data from satellites and other national assets 
 REQ.1.2 OUTPUT REQUIREMENTS 
  REQ.1.2.1 The system shall provide its status to the operator 
  REQ.1.2.2 The system shall provide battle damage assessment (BDA) to the 
operator 
  REQ.1.2.3 The system shall provide post mission data at the end of mission 
 REQ.1.2.4 The system shall has the capability of sending, receiving, and 
processing situational reports related to ballistic missile flight path 
 REQ.1.3 EXTERNAL INTERFACT REQUIREMENTS 
REQ.1.3.1 The system components shall remain operable after being exposed to 
temperatures ranging from -40 to 55 Celsius degree. 
  REQ.1.3.2 The system shall works under humidity OF 95% 
  REQ.1.3.3 The system shall remain functional during 45 kt wind conditions 
  REQ.1.3.4 The system shall works in sea state 
  REQ.1.3.5 The system shall be able to handle the air blast 
  REQ.1.3.6 The shall be able to works in the EMP environment 
  REQ.1.3.7 The system shall be able to handle the vibration 
  REQ.1.3.8 The system shall be able to handle the mechanical shock 




REQ.1.4.1 The BMD system shall scan for the threats to the protected area 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week with 99.99% accuracy 
REQ.1.4.2 The BMD system shall provide the ability to track all incoming missile 
threats approaching the protected area. 
   REQ.1.4.2.1 The system shall sense all objects entering protected area 
 REQ.1.4.2.2 The system shall determine flight characteristics of all 
objects in range 
   REQ.1.4.2.3 The system shall feed tracking data to detection system. 
   REQ.1.4.2.4 The system shall classify object if signature/threat status. 
   REQ.1.4.2.5 The system shall provide notification to decision authority. 
REQ.1.4.3 The BMD system shall provide the ability to detect threats 
approaching the protected area with 99.99% accuracy. 
   REQ.1.4.3.1 The system shall continuous monitoring of incoming 
threat(s). 
   REQ.1.4.3.2 The system shall be able to communicate of threat 
characteristics. 
   REQ.1.4.3.3 The system shall have the capability of prioritization of 
threats. 
   REQ.1.4.3.4 The system shall be able to communicate of threat status. 
REQ.1.4.4 The BMD system provides the ability to conduct command and 
control over activities to manage threat neutralization activities. 
   REQ.1.4.4.1 The system shall be able to determine the course of action. 
   REQ.1.4.4.2 The system shall be able to command the system to intercept. 
   REQ.1.4.4.3 The system shall be able to command the system to safe 
interceptor. 
REQ.1.4.5 The BMD system shall provide the ability to engage threats 
with 99.99% accuracy. 




   REQ.1.4.5.2 The system shall be able to perform fire control solution 
upload. 
   REQ.1.4.5.3 The system shall be able to perform arming of interceptor. 
   REQ.1.4.5.4 The system shall be able to perform deployment of 
interceptor. 
   REQ.1.4.5.5 The system shall be able to perform interception of threat(s). 
REQ.2 NON-FUNCITONAL (SYSTEM-WIDE) REQUIREMENTS 
 REQ.2.1 SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
  REQ.2.1.1 The system shall has the operational availability of 0.95 
 REQ.2.1.2 The system shall has the Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) 
of 22 hours 
REQ.2.1.3 The system shall has the Mean Time Operational Mission 
Failure (MTBOM) of 48 hours 
  REQ.2.1.4 The system shall have a scheduled maintenance of no more than 2 
hours. 
 REQ.2.1.5 The usability for training shall be measure in days to properly trained 
personnel. 
  REQ.2.1.6 The system shall have the efficiency of 0.95. 
  REQ.2.1.7 The system shall have the error rate less than 0.05 
  REQ.2.1.8 The system shall provide user friendly interfaces 
  REQ.2.1.9 The system shall provide the redundancy 
  REQ.2.1.10 The system shall be able to survive the small arms 
  REQ.2.1.11 The system shall have the BMD contact survivability 
  REQ.2.1.12 The system shall be able to survive of air blast 
  REQ.2.1.13 The system be comparable with assets defended 
  REQ.2.1.14 The system shall works with fielding 
  REQ.2.1.15 The system shall have the scalability 
  REQ.2.1.16 The system shall have the flexibility 




REQ.2.2.1 The system control station shall be able to operate on a power 
supply of either alternating current (AC) or direct current (DC) 
  REQ.2.2.2 The system shall not require more than LCS current physical power 
  REQ.2.2.3 The weapon system shall be able to fit the current LCS mission 
package slot 
 REQ.2.3 TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
  REQ.2.3.1 The system shall have the capability of upgrading to near future 
technology. 
 REQ.2.3.2 The system shall incorporate existing technology that can be obtained 
within 3 months. 
 REQ.2.4 STANDARDS AND PROTOCOLS 
  REQ.2.4.1 The system shall be built on common components architecture 
  REQ.2.4.2 The system shall be to communicate with C2 
  REQ.2.4.3 The system shall works with detection systems 
  REQ.2.4.4 The system shall works with tracking systems 
  REQ.2.4.5 The system shall works with weapon systems 
  REQ.2.4.6 The system shall works with support systems 
  REQ.2.4.7 The system shall be capable with foreign BMD systems 
  REQ.2.4.8 The system shall be operated by 10 or fewer within 24 hours. 
  REQ.2.4.9 The system shall has the software integration ability 
  REQ.2.4.10 The system shall has the physical integration capability 
  REQ.2.4.11 The system shall has the capability of electrical integration 
 REQ.2.4.12 The system shall integrate with current as well as future global U.S. 
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 
 REQ.2.5 COST REQUIREMENTS 
REQ.2.5.1 The completed mission package shall cost less than one half of 
an AEGIS system (about $600M (FY12 $)) 




REQ.2.6.1 The LCS integrated system shall target a capability need in the 
2020 timeframe. 
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